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COMMENT
BRASCHI v. STAHL: FAMILY REDEFINED
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 9, 1989, New York State's highest court, the Court of
Appeals, ruled that a homosexual couple was the legal equivalent of a
family under § 2204.6(d) of the New York City Rent and Eviction
Regulations.2 This was the first time the highest court of any state had
recognized homosexual couples as having any kind of legal rights. The
significance of Braschi v. Stahl Associates3 lies in the court's willingness
to reach beyond the traditional and legal definitions of "family" to
embrace a more realistic and contemporary definition. By ruling that a
homosexual couple is the legal equivalent of a family for the purposes of
§ 2204.6(d), the court has lent an air of legitimacy to relationships which
have traditionally been dismissed as both invalid and aberrant. The
opinion is worded so as to extend eviction protection not only to
homosexual couples but to all lifetime partnerships and to all other
non-traditional relationships characterized by residence "in households
having all of the normal familial characteristics." 4
In an effort to identify the ilmpact Braschi has had upon the legal
rights of non-traditional families, the party's arguments will be compared
and contrasted to the court's opinion. Similarly, the arguments of the
concurrence and dissent will be examined in order to highlight problems
and inconsistencies in the opinion.
1. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d
784 (1989).
2. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 2204.6(d) (McKinney 1987).
3. 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989).
4. Id. at 211, 543 N.E.2d at 53-54, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 788-89.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief Overview of Rent Regulation in New York
The rents of many private rental units in New York City are
subject to either the Rent and Eviction Regulations5 of New York City or
the New York City Rent Stabilization Code.' Although it is the Rent
Control Code that concerns us for the purposes of this Comment,
allusions to similarities and distinctions between the two statutes will be
made where appropriate and pertinent to the litigation at hand. The most
significant distinction that has been made between the two statutes in case
law is that the Rent Stabilization Law is a "less onerous burden on the
property owner" than the Rent Control Code.' Otherwise, like the Code,
Rent Stabilization Law, protects tenants from "speculative, unwarranted
and abnormal increases in rents." '8
Unlike the Rent Control Code which is managed by a
governmental agency, 9 the Rent Stabilization Law is regulated by the real
estate industry itself.10 Once a rent-controlled apartment is vacated, it
is automatically subject to the less rigorous provisions of the Rent
Stabilization law" which enables a landlord to raise rents to the more
generous stabilization levels. 2 The two measures have similar goals but
the terms and definitions of one cannot be freely interchanged with the
terms and definitions of the other.1 3 Consequently, although the term
"family" is defined in the stabilization law, this definition is neither
5. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 2200.1-2210.3 (McKinney 1987).
6. id. §§ 26-501 to -520.
7. Sullivan v. Brevard Assocs., 66 N.Y.2d 489, 494-95, 488 N.E.2d 1208, 1211,
498 N.Y.S.2d 96, 99 (1985). Compare N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 26-501 to -520 (New
York City Rent Stabilization) with §§ 26-401 to -415 (New York City Rent Control).
See also 8200 Realty Corp. v. Lindsay, 27 N.Y.2d 124, 136-37, 261 N.E.2d 647, 654,
313 N.Y.S.2d 733, 742-43 (1970).
8. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-501 (McKinney 1987).
9. Id. § 26-404.
10. Id. § 26-511.
11. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 209, 543 N.E.2d at 52, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 787 (citing
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 2520.11(a), 2521.1(a)(1) (McKinney 1987)).
12. See N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 2521-2522.4 (McKinney 1987) (this policy is
known as "vacancy decontrol").
13. See Sullivan, 66 N.Y.2d at 494-95, 488 N.E.2d at 1210-11, 498 N.Y.S.2d at
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controlling nor helpful. 14
The Rent Control Code"5 was enacted to address "a serious
public emergency" as a result of an "acute shortage of dwellings" in the
city.16 Its legislative purpose is to regulate and control occupied private
rental units in existence prior to February 1, 1947.17 The regulation
states that "[n]o occupant of housing accommodations shall be evicted
under this section where the occupant is either the surviving spouse of the
deceased tenant of some other member of the deceased tenant's family
who has been living with the tenant. " "
B. Persons Protected by § 2204.6(d) Prior to Braschi v.
Stahl Associates Co.
In the instant case, the court determined how the Legislature
intended to construe the term "family" when applying the non-eviction
provision found at § 2204.6(d). Its guides were its prior decisions in
similar cases, as well as the general purpose of the code which is "to
prevent uncertainty, hardship and dislocation" and to "protect the public
14. See infra note 171.
15. The code has a complex history which, for the purposes of this Comment,
merits a cursory look. The Emergency Housing Rent Control Law of 1946, 1946 N.Y.
Laws 274 (codified as amended at N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 8581-8597 (McKinney
1987)), which is a state law, was the genesis of what is today the Rent Control Code.
In 1962 the New York State Legislature enacted the Local Emergency Housing Rent
Control Act, 1962 N.Y. Laws 21 (codified as amended at N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §§
8601-8617 (McKinney 1987)), which is referred to as the "State Enabling Act." This
Act shifted authority over residential accommodations from the state to the city. That
same year, the City Council passed Local Law 20 which mirrored the State Enabling
Act, thereby creating the New York City Rent and Rehabilitation Law, which is most
commonly referred to as the Rent Control Code. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-401
(McKinney 1987). The Department of Housing Preservation and Development of the
City of New York (HPD) then administered the City's rent control program. Passage
of the Omnibus Housing Act (OHA) shifted back to the state the burden of administering
the rent control program and the HPD was replaced by the Division of Housing and
Community Renewal (DHCR). The Omnibus Housing Act, 1983 N.Y. Laws 403
(codified in scattered sections of N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FiN. LAW; N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW;
and N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW). Section 2204.6(d) is part of the New York City Rent and
Eviction Regulations but is referred to as a "state" regulation. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW
§ 2204.6(d) (McKinney 1987).
16. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8581(1) (McKinney 1987) ("Declaration and
findings").
17. Id. §§ 26-401 to -414.
18. Id. § 2204.6(d).
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health, safety and general welfare."19
1. Close and Distant Relatives
Prior to Braschi, the Court of Appeals had determined that
siblings occupying a rent-controlled apartment with the primary tenant
were entitled to a renewal lease upon that tenant's vacancy.' In dicta,
the court indicated that "family includes relatives more distant than
siblings" for the purposes of the non-eviction regulation.21 In 829
Seventh Avenue v. Reider, the court suggested that the granddaughter
of the deceased tenant-of-record would have been permitted a renewal
lease as a "family" member had she been able to prove that she in fact
had been living with that tenant with some "indicia of permanence or
continuity."' Although the landlord prevailed and the granddaughter
was evicted, the court again showed a responsiveness to a broader
construction of the term "family" to include persons "living with such
statutory tenant in a family unit. " '
2. Functional Family Members
The lower courts have similarly protected persons who hold
themselves out to enjoy a "parent-child" relationship, despite the fact that
there is no relationship by blood, marriage or formal adoption.' The
19. Id. § 8581.
20. In re Herzog v. Joy, 74 A.D.2d 372, 428 N.Y.S.2d 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980),
aft'd, 53 N.Y.2d 821, 422 N.E.2d 582, 439 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1981).
21. Id. at 376, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 3.
22. 67 N.Y.2d 930, 493 N.E.2d 939, 502 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1986).
23. Id. at 933, 493 N.E.2d at 941, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 717. "Living with" was
interpreted by the Court of Appeals to mean living with the tenant of record in a "family
unit which in turn connotes an arrangement, whatever its duration, bearing some indicia
of permanence or continuity." Id. In the instant case, it was undisputed that Braschi
"lived with" Blanchard. However, this was a question of fact to be determined by the
appellate division; it was not an issue that the court of appeals addressed.
24. Id. at 932, 493 N.E.2d at 941, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
25. See Athineos v. Thayer, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 25, 1987, at 14, col. 4 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
Dec. 31, 1986), aft'd, 153 A.D.2d 825, 545 N.Y.S.2d 337 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
The courts, in effect, saw this relationship as a defacto adoption. Athineos, 153 A.D.2d
at 826, 545 N.Y.$.2d at 338. This affirmation relied on Braschi's successful appeal
before the Court of Appeals. Id.; see also 2-4 Realty Assocs. v. Pittman, 137 Misc. 2d
898, 523 N.Y.S.2d 7 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987), discussed infra notes 29-31 and
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courts have extended non-eviction protection to an orphan who had lived
with a family for 45 years without the benefit of adoption.' The
justification for this decision was that the woman had become "so
assimilated into this family as to be the equivalent of the [tenant's]
daughter."' 7 The level of support and commitment among the "family"
members in this case was critical in the court's determination.' Similar
protection was afforded by the Civil Court in 2-4 Realty Associates v.
Pittman,'S where a woman and her son had lived with the primary tenant
of record. The tenant had never married the woman nor adopted her son,
but the court ruled, the man was indeed a surviving family member of the
primary tenant's family.' The court incorporated a six point test in its
decision: 1) longevity of relationship; 2) level of commitment and support
(both material and emotional); 3) the sense in which the members define
themselves as a family unit as well as how neighbors and others define
them as a family unit; 4) reliance by members on each other for daily
family services; 5) members shared history, such as "family" photos; 6)
high degree or moral and religious commitment in determining whether
the survivor should be protected from eviction.3" These criteria seem to
be the genesis for the Braschi court's controversial four point test.32
3. Heterosexual Life Partnerships
The lower courts' opinions construing survivor's rights under §
2204.6(d) have been inconsistent where the survivors were either
heterosexual or homosexual life partners of the tenant. Although New
York does not recognize common-law marriage,33 the New York Civil
Court in Zimmerman v. Burton' held that the non-eviction regulation of
the Rent Control Code "does not permit a distinction to be made between
accompanying text.
26. Athineos, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 25, 1987, at 14, col. 4
27. Id.
28. Id. at 14, col. 5.
29. 137 Misc. 2d 898, 523 N.Y.S.2d 7 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987).
30. Id. at 907, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 12-13.
31. Id. at 902, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
32. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 212-13, 543 N.E.2d at 55, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
33. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Burton, 107 Misc. 2d 401, 403, 434 N.Y.S.2d 127,
128-29 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980).
34. Id.
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a bereaved respondent and a widower with a marriage certificate."35
The court ruled that the surviving female of a heterosexual life partnership
qualified as "some other member of the deceased tenant's family"' and
was entitled to remain in the apartment with a renewal lease under the
non-eviction regulation.37 In so determining, the court looked to the
"quality" of the relationship and the "quantity" of time the couple spent
together.38
Park South Associates v. Daniels" exemplifies the opposite point
of view. The court in Park South determined that the female survivor of
a heterosexual life partnership was a mere "occupant" who was not
entitled to continued occupancy after her partner's death.' The civil
court decision was influenced by the court of appeals decision in Hudson
View v. Weiss4" ruling that an "immediate family clause" limiting
occupancy of a rent controlled apartment to the tenant and her "immediate
family" was valid and enforceable.42 The Park South court also looked
to the "Roommate Law" for corroboration of its decision. '
The law, which applies to all apartments, not just controlled and
stabilized apartments, restricts the rights of a landlord to evict unrelated
occupants, so long as the tenant-of-record remains in the apartment."
A year later, in Lepow v. Gress,' a heterosexual survivor was again
denied a renewal lease under the non-eviction regulation, this time by the
New York Appellate Term. The court in Lepow asserted that persons who
live together do so "'without [the] benefit of the rules of law that govern
property and financial matters between married couples.'""
35. Id. at 403, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 129 (citation omitted).
36. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 2204.6(d) (McKinney 1987).
37. Zimmerman, 107 Misc. 2d at 404, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 129; see also N.Y.
UNCONSOL. LAW § 2523.5(b)(1).
38. Zimmerman, 107 Misc. 2d at 404, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 129.
39. 121 Misc. 2d 933, 469 N.Y.S.2d 319 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1983).
40. Id. The couple had lived together for 25 years prior to the primary tenant's
death. Id. at 935, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
41. 59 N.Y.2d 733, 450 N.E.2d 234, 463 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1983).
42. Id. at 735, 450 N.E.2d at 235, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 429.
43. Park South Assocs., 121 Misc. 2d at 935, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 321; see also N.Y.
REAL PRoP. LAW § 235-f (McKinney 1987).
44. Park South Assocs., 121 Misc. 2d at 934, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
45. N.Y.L.J., July 2, 1984, at 14, col. 1 (N.Y. App. Term) (No. 83-769).
46. Id. (quoting Moronev. Morone, 50 N.Y.2d 481, 487,413 N.E.2d 1154, 1157,
429 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595 (1980)).
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4. Homosexual Life Partnerships
Similar conflicts existed where the rights of a surviving
homosexual life partner were involved. In Gelman v. Casteneda,47 the
civil court concluded that a surviving homosexual life partner was a
member of the deceased tenant-of-record's family, and entitled to
non-eviction protection under the New York City Rent and Eviction
Regulations." In 1987, the State Supreme Court in Braschi49 bolstered
Gelman by similarly ordering that survivor protection be granted to
Braschi on the grounds that his ten year relationship with a now deceased
lover "'fulfills any definitional criteria of the term family.'"" Although
the supreme court decision was reversed the following year by the
appellate division, it was later reinstated by the court of appeals.5"
One month after its reversal in Bragchi, the appellate division
decided Koppelman v. O'Keeffe.52 Plaintiff O'Keeffe's argument was
that there was no rational basis for the different treatment accorded
married and unmarried persons under § 2204.6(d).53 At issue was
whether it was a violation of equal protection rights or discriminatory on
the basis of sexual preference to deny homosexual life partners protection
from eviction where the primary tenant no longer occupies the
apartment.' The appellate term determined that, in light of its decision
in Lepow,5" which denied unmarried heterosexual couples protection
under the non-eviction regulation, and the appellate division's reversal of
Braschi, it was "neither a denial of equal protection of the law nor
discrimination based on sexual preference" to refuse to extend § 2204.6(d)
47. N.Y.L.J., Oct. 22, 1986, at 13, col. 1 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.).
48. Id.; see also N.Y. Unconsol. Law §§ 2200.1-2210.3 (McKinney 1987).
49. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., No. 2194/87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 18, 1987),
rev'd, 143 A.D.2d 44, 531 N.Y.S.2d 562 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988), rev'd, 74 N.Y.2d
201, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989).
50. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 9, Braschiv. Stahl Assocs. Co., 74 N.Y.2d 201,
544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989) (No. 02194-87) [hereinafter Brief for Braschil (quoting Record
on Appeal at 14).
51. Braschi, 143 A.D.2d 44, 531 N.Y.S.2d 562 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988), rev'd, 74
N.Y.2d 201, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989).
52. 140 Misc. 2d 828, 535 N.Y.S.2d 871 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
53. Id. at 830, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 873.
54. Id.
55. Lepowv. Gress, N.Y.L.J., July 2, 1984, at 14, col. 1 (N.Y. App. Term July
2, 1984).
1990] 295
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protection to similarly situated homosexual life partners.'
The Koppelman decision is opaque and strained. It proposed that
if heterosexuals in non-traditional relationships can be denied protection
from eviction under § 2204.6(d), it is likewise acceptable to deny
homosexuals protection. 7 The court responded to plaintiff's argument
that homosexuals cannot legally marry because of state prohibitions by
observing that only the legislature has the power to grant legal status to
homosexual relationships. 58 Rather than determining whether distinctions
between "family" as traditionally defined and non-traditional families
under § 2204.6(d) are proper at all, the court skirted the issue altogether
by holding that non-eviction protection is a product of the legislature and,
therefore, governed by statute."
III. THE FACTS
Plaintiff-appellant Miguel Braschi (Braschi) and Leslie Blanchard
(Blanchard) lived together as homosexual life partners in a rent-controlled
apartment in New York City's midtown area from the summer of 1975
until Blanchard's death in September 1986.' For the more than ten
years in which Braschi and Blanchard lived together, "[tihey regarded one
another, and in turn were regarded by family and friends as spouses."61
Blanchard was the only tenant of record on the lease62 and the apartment
was the only residence Braschi that had during this time.' The couple
had consolidated their financial affairs by becoming authorized signatories
of three different safe deposit accounts and had maintained joint checking,
savings, and credit card accounts." Blanchard executed a power of
attorney so that Braschi could make all the necessary decisions (financial,
medical and personal) during Blanchard's illness.' Braschi was also the
56. Koppelman, 140 Misc. 2d at 831, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 873.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 832, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 874.
59. Id.
60. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 206, 543 N.E.2d at 50, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 785-86.
61. Id. at 213, 543 N.E.2d at 55, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
62. Id. at 206, 543 N.E.2d at 51, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 786.
63. Brief for Braschi, supra note 50, at 7 (citing Record on Appeal at 31).
64. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 213, 543 N.E.2d at 51, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 790 (monthly




named beneficiary of Blanchard's life insurance policy' as well as the
primary legatee and co-executor of Blanchard's estate which was in excess
of $5,000,000.67
IV. THE LOWER COURT DECISIONS
A. The New York Supreme Court Decision
In November of 1986, subsequent to Blanchard's death,
respondent, Stahl Associates Company (Stahl), the landlord and owner of
the apartment building, served a Notice to Cure on Braschi." Stahl
contended that Braschi "was a mere licensee with no right to occupy the
apartment since only Blanchard was the tenant of record."'' In
December of 1986, Stahl notified Braschi he had one month to vacate the
premises.'
Braschi brought an action in the New York Supreme Court of
New York County seeking a preliminary injunction pendente lite enjoining
Stahl from taking any action to terminate his tenancy."' The issue before
the New York State Supreme Court was whether Braschi was a member
of Blanchard's family within the meaning of § 2204.6(d). '
After examining the nature of the relationship, Judge Baer ruled
that Braschi was a "family member" within the meaning of the regulation
and that his long-term interdependent relationship with Blanchard "fulfills
any definitional criteria of the term 'family.'"" Braschi's motion was
granted and the eviction halted.74
66. Id.
67. Brief of Defendant-Respondent at 3, Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 74 N.Y.2d
201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989) (No. 02194-87) [hereinafter Brief for
Stahl].
68. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 206, 543 N.E.2d at 51, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 786.
69. Id.
70. Id. Stahl served a Notice to Tenant of Non-Renewal of the Lease, Termination
and Intention to Recover Possession, informing Braschi of the deadline. Brief for Stahl,
supra note 67, at 3-4.
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B. The Appellate Division Decision
Stahl appealed the decision to the New York Appellate Division,
First Department.75 It argued on appeal that Braschi, even if he was the
surviving homosexual life partner of the deceased tenant-of-record, had
not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits76 because he was
neither the surviving spouse of the decedent nor a member of the
decedent's family pursuant to § 2204.6(d).' Stahl further argued that
Braschi had not demonstrated the requisite irreparable harm for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction because he had inherited $5 million
from Blanchard' and was capable of finding alternative housing at
prevailing market rates. 9
The appellate division reversed, holding that Braschi was not
entitled to a preliminary injunction.' The court concluded that he had
not persuasively demonstrated that the legislature, in enacting § 2204.6(d)
to protect spouses and family members from eviction, had intended to
extend that protection to include non-traditional family relationships.81
Such an inclusion would be tantamount to granting legal status and
recognition to such relationships.' Noting that "[h]omosexual partners
can not yet legally marry nor enter into legally recognized family
relationships,"' the court asserted that it is up to the legislature to grant
some kind of legal status to homosexual relationships.,' Consequently,
protection from non-eviction for a survivor was held to benefit "[o]nly
surviving spouses and family members within traditional, legally
recognized familial relationships." 5
The court was careful to distinguish the issue to be resolved in
Braschi from cases where there are "[i]ssues of right of association and
protection from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or marital
75. Braschi, 143 A.D.2d 44, 531 N.Y.S.2d 562.
76. Id.
77. Brief for Stahl, supra note 67, at 5.
78. Id. at 5-6.
79. Id. at 6.
80. Braschi, 143 A.D.2d at 44, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 563.
81. Id. at 45, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 563.
82. id.
83. id. (citing In re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 63 N.Y.2d 233, 238-39, 481





status." 6 It narrowly interpreted the issue as one of the "[right to
succession to the leasehold property rights of a rent-controlled tenant."17
Because this right did not exist at common law, 8 the court reasoned that
the assertion of such a right is governed purely by statute.'
C. The Court of Appeals Decision
The appellate court's reversal was decided strictly on a question
of law; its decision involved no facts or discretion.' As a result, the
appellate division granted Braschi leave to appeal to the court of appeals
on the following certified question of law: "Was the order of this Court,
which reversed the Supreme Court, properly made?"91  Was Braschi
"some other member of the deceased tenants family" and therefore entitled
to preliminary injunctive relief on the grounds that he had demonstrated
a likelihood of success on the merits?'
1. The Plaintiff-Appellant's Arguments on Appeal
On appeal, Braschi argued that a broad construction of the term
family was necessary and a functional definition should be adopted so as
to promote the objectives of § 2204.6(d). 3 Braschi identified the goals
of the regulation as: 1) protecting those cohabiting family members whose
names do not happen to appear on the lease;' 2) protecting grieving
family members from the chaotic housing market;95 and 3) preservation
of family homes for surviving and bereaved family members.'
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Robinson v. Jewett, 116 N.Y. 40, 51, 22 N.E. 224,227 (1889); McDonald
v. Fiss, 54 A.D. 489, 493, 67 N.Y.S. 34 (N.Y. App. Div. 1900).
89. Braschi, 143 A.D.2d at 45, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 563.
90. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 207, 54 N.E.2d at 51, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 786.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 206, 543 N.E.2d at 52, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 785 (emphasis in original).
93. Brief for Braschi, supra note 50, at 29-35.
94. Id. at 26.
95. Id. at 27.
96. Id.
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Braschi also argued that the court's analysis in various zoning
cases was analogous to the instant case and controlling.' 7 In these
decisions, the court focused on the effect zoning ordinances had on the
ability of persons to live together in areas zoned for single-family homes
only." The non-eviction regulation protects tenants which are classified
according to family relationships." As in the zoning cases, Braschi
maintained, careful attention should be paid to this classification to ensure
that it is sufficiently related to the purpose of that regulation. 11 In
McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay,"'1 the court struck down a zoning
ordinance that defined family based on blood, marriage or adoption as
unconstitutional. 1" Similarly, Braschi contended, the regulation which
protects survivors from eviction should either be interpreted so as to
include persons such as Braschi, or also be struck down."°
Braschi maintained that New York's lower courts have
consistently resisted too narrow or restrictive definitions of "family"
because such narrow definitions bear no relationship to the purpose of
§ 2204.6(d)."°4  In addition to protecting close"°5 and distant"° blood
97. Id. at 17-20 (discussing City of White Plains v. Ferrailoli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313
N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974) (a group home, for neglected and abandoned
children, consisting of a married couple, their own two children and 10 foster children
was a "family" and could be maintained in a single-family residence district); Group
House of Port Washington, Inc. v. Board of Zoning and Appeals of N. Hempstead, 45
N.Y.2d 266, 272, 380 N.E.2d 207, 209, 408 N.Y.S.2d 377, 380 (1978) (group home
for disturbed children was the "functional and factual equivalent of a natural family");
McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 66 N.Y.2d 544, 488 N.E.2d 1240, 498 N.Y.S.2d 128
(1985) (a home in which four unrelated young men lived was deemed a "single-family"
home and the town's zoning ordinance was struck down as unconstitutionally regulating
living arrangements)).
98. Brief for Braschi, supra note 50, at 17-18.
99. Id. at 25-27.
100. Id. at 25-26.
101. 66 N.Y.2d 544, 488 N.E.2d 1240, 498 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1985).
102. Id. at 552, 498 N.E.2d at 1242, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 132.
103. Brief for Braschi, supra note 50, at 46.
104. id. at 20-21.
105. Id. at 21 (discussing In re Herzog v. Joy, 74 A.D.2d 372, 428 N.Y.S.2d 922
(N.Y. App. Div. 1980), af'd, 53 N.Y.2d 821, 422 N.E.2d 582, 439 N.Y.S.2d 922
(1981) (court giving sister the right to remain in the apartment after the primary tenant
vacated the premises)); see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
106. Brief for Braschi, supra note 50, at 21 (discussing 829 Seventh Ave. v.
Reider, 67 N.Y.2d 930, 493 N.E.2d 939, 502 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1986)); see supra notes
22-23 and accompanying text.
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relatives, Braschi insisted that the courts have recognized and protected
functional family members as well. 10o
Braschi challenged Stahl's argument that the purpose of the
non-eviction regulation is to insure the orderly succession of property by
asserting that it exists to provide protection against eviction of
cohabitators. 1° He supported that argument by explaining that tenancy
in a rent controlled apartment is not an alienable right that can be willed
away or otherwise disposed of."°
2. The Defendant-Respondent's Arguments
on Appeal
Stahl also argued that the non-eviction regulation exists to protect
surviving spouses and family members within traditional, legally
recognized familial relationships only."' He challenged Braschi's
assertion that, as the surviving homosexual life partner of a deceased
tenant-of-record, he was a member of decedent's family for the purposes
of § 2204.6(d) by arguing that Braschi did not even attempt to claim to
be the deceased's spouse.' Because homosexuals may not marry, and
the legislature has not conferred legal status to an emotional relationship
between two unrelated persons, Stahl cautioned the court against including
such relationships within the ambit of the non-eviction regulation."'
Stahl maintained that because Braschi had the burden of proof in seeking
a preliminary injunction, he must prove irreparable harm if denied such
107. Brief for Braschi, supra note 50, at 21 (discussing Athineos v. Thayer,
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 25, 1987, at 14, col. 4 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Dec. 31, 1986), aff'd, 153
A.D.2d 825, 545 N.Y.S.2d 337 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); see supra note 25 and
accompanying text; 2-4 Realty Assocs. v. Pittman, 137 Misc. 2d 898, 523 N.Y.S.2d 7
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987); see supra note 25 and accompanying text; Zimmerman v. Burton,
107 Misc. 2d 401, 434 N.Y.S.2d 127 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1983); see supra notes 34-48;
Gelman v. Casteneda, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 22, 1986, at 13, col. 1 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Oct. 21,
1986); see supra note 47 and accompanying text).
108. Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 2, Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 74
N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989) (No. 02194/87) [hereinafter
Braschi Reply Brief].
109. Id. at 3.
110. Brief for Stahl, supra note 67, at 13-15.
111. Id. at 14, 35.
112. Id. at 38-39 (referring to In re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 63 N.Y.2d 233,
471 N.E.2d 424, 481 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1984)).
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relief.113
Stahl credited the appellate division as having correctly identified
the non-eviction regulation as one controlling succession rights to an
interest in property; consequently, Stahl reasoned that the phrase "member
of the deceased's family"" 4 should be interpreted in light of the
intestacy statutes." 5  "Family," as used in the intestacy statutes, is
defined restrictively to include any relationships by blood, marriage and
adoption." 6 Because the state's intestacy laws do not legally recognize
the Appellant's relationship to the now deceased tenant and § 2204.6(d)
is governed by the intestacy statues, Stahl concluded that Braschi should
not be entitled to a right of succession to the apartment."'
Stahl further reasoned that an expansion of the legal definition of
"family" under the rent control regulation would be in derogation of a
landlord's rights to re-lease a rent controlled apartment when the primary
tenant leaves behind no surviving spouse, or other family member who
had been living with him."" Stahl insisted that the court not formulate
new succession rights to include persons not previously protected under
this regulation. 19  Stahl pointed out that the very language of §
2204.6(d) supports the "traditional" interpretation of the term family1"
and that had the Legislature intended a broader interpretation it could have
easily done so by extending protection to anyone living with the deceased
tenant-of-record. 121
113. Brief for Stahl, supra note 67, at 13 n.10 (citing Ambruster v. Gipp, 103
A.D.2d 1014, 478 N.Y.S.2d 419 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (plaintiff has burden of proving
that he will be irreparably damaged if an injunction is not granted); 233 E. 86th Corp.
v. Park E. Apartments, Inc., 131 Misc. 2d 242, 499 N.Y.S.2d 853 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1986) (the threatened injury must not be compensable by monetary damages)).
114. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 2204.6(d) (McKinney 1987).
115. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1 (McKinney Supp. 1990).
116. Brief for Stahl, supra note 67, at 19 (referring to N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW § 7-4.1 (McKinney 1987)).
117. Id. at 16-19.
118. id. at 54.
119. Id.




3. The Plurality Decision"
In writing the opinion of the court, Judge Titone proclaimed that
the term family, as used in the non-eviction regulation, should not be
rigidly restricted to include only those persons who have formalized their
relationship through marriage or adoption." The court of appeals
rejected the appellate court's interpretation of the provision" providing
protection against eviction only to "surviving spouses and family members
within traditional, legally recognized familial relationships.""25
Additionally, the court limited the decision in In re Adoption of Robert
Paul P.'2 to the area of domestic relations by saying that the case had
"no bearing on the proper interpretation of a provision in the rent control
laws. " " In Robert Paul P.,the court had ruled that one homosexual
adult male could not adopt another simply to grant some kind of legal
status to their relationship." s The appellate division had drawn upon
this decision to support the contention that because homosexual partners
cannot marry, they have no legal status and, therefore, are not protected
from eviction under § 2204.6(d)."2  The court concluded that the
"intended protection against sudden eviction should not rest on fictitious
legal distinctions or genetic history, but instead should find its foundation
in the reality of family life.""
The plurality perceived the "reality of family life" as necessarily
including homosexual lifetime partnerships whose characteristics include
emotional and financial commitment and interdependence, much like the
relationship Braschi and Blanchard shared."' The court examined the
purpose of § 2204.6(d) and determined that it is to protect the occupants
122. The plurality opinion was penned by Judge Titone and was joined by Judges
Kaye and Alexander; Judge Bellacosa concurred separately. See Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at
201, 543 N.E.2d at 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 784.
123. Id. at 211, 543 N.E.2d at 53, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 788 (plurality opinion).
124. Id. at 206-07, 543 N.E.2d at 51, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 786.
125. Braschi, 143 A.D.2d at 45, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 563.
126. 63 N.Y.2d 233, 471 N.E.2d 424, 481 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1984).
127. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 210, 543 N.E.2d at 53, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 788
(discussing Robert Paul P., 63 N.Y.2d 233, 471 N.E.2d 424, 481 N.Y.S.2d 652).
128. Robert Paul P., 63 N.Y.2d at 238, 471 N.E.2d at 427, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
129. Braschi, 143 A.D.2d at 45, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 563.
130. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 211, 543 N.E.2d at 53, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
131. Id., 543 N.E.2d at 54, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
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of an apartment from sudden displacement.3 2 The court took that
analysis one step further by ruling that, in light of the goal underlying the
regulation, it was reasonable to conclude that the legislature intended to
extend coverage "to those [persons] who reside in household having all of
the normal familial characteristics." 33 Not only was the court ruling
that a homosexual couple was family, it was ruling that almost any
non-traditional arrangement which had "familial characteristics""3 could
qualify as a family unit, enabling its members to seek protection under the
regulation at issue.'35
Judge Titone also spoke in terms of "the expectations of
individuals who live in such nuclear units,""u implying that persons
living together in what is considered a family arrangement expect to be
able to stay on in the apartment they consider their home the way a wife
or child would in a traditional family. 37
On appeal, Stahl argued that the appellate division had correctly
identified the non-eviction regulation as a state regulation governing
succession rights to an interest in property."' Accordingly, Stahl
argued that the phrase "member of the deceased tenant's family"'39
should be interpreted in light of the intestacy statutes."0 The definition
of a family, for the purposes of these statutes, is restricted to relationships
of blood, marriage and adoption 4' so as to promote the overall goal of
orderly succession to real property. 42 Stahl had also argued that
because a homosexual couple has no legal status, the parties have no
rights under the state's intestacy laws."'3 The court rejected these
arguments by ruling that the purpose of a non-eviction regulation
protecting survivors is not to assure the orderly succession to the
apartment by the deceased's family, rather the purpose is to protect the
132. Id. at 210, 543 N.E.2d at 53, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 788.





138. Brief for Stahl, supra note 67, at 16.
139. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 2204.6(d) (McKinney 1987).
140. Brief for.Stahl, supra note 67, at 19.
141. See generally N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1 (McKinney 1987).
142. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 209, 543 N.E.2d at 52-53, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
143. Id., 543 N.E.2d at 52-53, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 787-88.
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occupants of the apartment from the sudden loss of their home.'" It
emphasized that the ability to renew a lease to a rent-controlled apartment
is not an alienable property right that can be sold, assigned or otherwise
disposed of in any way.14
Stahl argued that it would be a derogation of the landlord's rights
to allow persons previously not protected under § 2204.6(d) to claim
succession rights to a rent-controlled apartment. 1" Under this
reasoning, by expanding the category of persons entitled to such
protection, the court would not be encouraging the "transition from
regulation to a normal market of free bargaining between landlord and
tenant. '"147 This argument is supported by current regulations which
allow a rent-controlled apartment to be raised to rent stabilization rates in
the event of the death, or voluntary vacancy, of the primary tenant.14
The court, however, discredited this argument by insisting that "such a
construction would afford protection to distant blood relatives who
actually had but a superficial relationship with the deceased tenant while
denying that protection to unmarried lifetime partners." 49 The dissent
criticized the court's definition of "family" as overinclusive and
indefinite." Judge Titone responded to this criticism by stating that it
was the dissent's own definition of family, one which included only
legally recognized relationships, that may "cast an even wider net, since
the number of blood relationships an individual has will usually exceed the
number of people who would qualify [for § 2204.6(d)] by our
standard."151
The "standard" referred to by the court is a four point test that
Judge Titone recommended be followed when assessing an individual's
right to protection from eviction from a rent-controlled apartment.152
The test is a composite between a number of factors the lower courts have
considered in similar cases, and an extensive list of criteria promoted by
144. Id. at 210, 543 N.E.2d at 53, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
145. Id.
146. Brief for Stahl, supra note 67, at 54.
147. Id. (citing N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-401 (McKinney 1987)).
148. Id.; see also supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
149. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 210, 543 N.E.2d at 53, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
150. Id. at 216, 543 N.E.2d at 57, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 792.
151. Id. at 211 n.1, 543 N.E.2d at 54 n.1, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 789 n.1.
152. Id. at 212, 543 N.E.2d at 55, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
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an expert witness for the respondent in 2-4 Realty Associates v.
Pittman." The factors to be taken into account are: 1) the exclusivity
and longevity of the relationship; 2) the level of emotional and financial
commitment; 3) how the parties have conducted their everyday lives and
held themselves out to society; and 4) the reliance placed upon one
another for daily family services."s By applying these criteria, Judge
Titone urged, a court would then be able to make an objective and factual
determination of the nature of the relationship in question. "' It is not
necessary that all criteria be met, rather it is the "totality of the
relationship as evidenced by the dedication, caring and self-sacrifice of the
parties" that should ultimately 'be the litmus test." Judge Titone
asserted that by applying this test to the facts in this case a court could
reasonably conclude that Braschi and Blanchard were more than "mere
roommates.""'57 The court, however, did not reach this conclusion
because Braschi appeared before it on a certified question of law and
these remaining issues were questions of fact to be determined by the
appellate division.'58
In interpreting the term "family," the court applied accepted rules
of statutory construction.'" The court examined the general legislative
purpose of the Rent Control Code and identified it as a tenant protection
measure designed to prevent unsavory practices such as "unjust,
unreasonable and oppressive rents and rental agreements" and to "prevent
uncertainty, hardship and dislocation'."1W It determined that the Code
in general is remedial in nature and the intent of § 2204.6(d) is to "restrict
the landowner's ability to evict a narrow class of occupants other than the
tenant-of-record. "161 The court, therefore, found further support for its
conclusion that family members, regardless of legal status, "who have
153. 137 Misc. 2d at 902, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 901-02 (discussed supra notes 29-31
and accompanying text). Note the striking similarity between the language of Braschi
criteria and those in 2-4 Realty Assocs.
154. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 212-13, 543 N.E.2d at 55, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
155. Id. at 212, 543 N.E.2d at 55, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
156. Id. at 213, 543 N.E.2d at 55, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 214, 543 N.E.2d at 55, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 790; see supra note 23 and
accompanying text.
159. d. at 207-08, 543 N.E.2d at 51-52, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 786-87.
160. ld. at 208, 543 N.E.2d at 52, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 787 (citing N.Y. UNCONSOL.
LAW §§ 8581-8597 (McKinney 1987)).
161. Id. at 208-09, 543 N.E.2d at 52, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
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always treated the apartment as their family home" must be protected
under the noneviction regulation."
The court was unpersuaded by Braschi's argument that its prior
decisions in the area of zoning were controlling."1 The concept of
"functional family," that was developed by the court in the context of
zoning ordinances1" was deemed to have no relevance to the Rent
Control Code. 1" These decisions, according to the court, focused on
the effects local ordinances have on the ability of unrelated persons to live
together in an area zoned only for "single-family" homes.1" The
zoning ordinance in McMinn was struck down as violative of the due
process clause of the New York State Constitution. 67 In its refusal to
discuss the constitutionality of the non-eviction regulation it is implicit that
the court was either eager to avoid this controversy or believed that, even
without an expanded definition of "family," the regulation would not
necessarily have been an unconstitutional denial of equal protection.1"
Although the Rent Stabilization Law clearly defines who are
"family" members, the court refused to import these definitions for use
in the Braschi case, even by analogy. Its refusal reinforced the court's
holding in Sullivan v. Brevard Associates" which construed the rights
of cohabitators in rent stabilized apartments and which identified Rent
Stabilization as a "less onerous regulation [on the property owner] than
Rent Control."'" By carefully wording its opinion, the court made it
clear that it did not intend to make-sweeping changes to the definition of
162. Id. at 212, 543 N.E.2d at 54, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
163. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
164. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 212 n.3, 543 N.E.2d at 54 n.3, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 789
n.3; see also Baer v. Town of Brookhaven, 73 N.Y.2d 942, 537 N.E.2d 619, 540
N.Y.S.2d 234 (1989); McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 66 N.Y.2d 544, 488 N.E.2d
1240, 498 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1985); Group House of Port Washington, Inc. v. Board of
Zoning and Appeals of N. Hempstead, 45 N.Y.2d 266, 380 N.E.2d 207, 408 N.Y.S.2d
377 (1978).
165. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 212 n.3, 543 N.E.2d at 54 n.3, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 789
n.3.
166. Id.
167. McMinn, 66 N.Y.2d at 551-52, 488 N.E.2d at 1243, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 132.
168. Brief for Stahl, supra note 67, at 47 (citing Nixon v. Administrator for Gen.
Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 471 n.33 (1977)).
169. 66 N.Y.2d 489, 488 N.E.2d 1208, 498 N.Y.S.2d 96 (1985); see also supra
notes 7, 13 and accompanying text.
170: Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 210, 543 N.E.2d at 53, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 788 (citing
Sullivan, 66 N.Y.2d at 494, 488 N.E.2d at 1211, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 99).
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"family" in any other part of the code. 171
The plurality disagreed with the dissent's argument that Hudson
View construed "immediate family" to be exclusive of individuals
unrelated by blood marriage or adoption, notwithstanding "the close and
loving relationship" of the parties."r  The plurality insisted that the
question of the status of the tenant as a family member was never
addressed either explicitly or implicitly in Hudson View."' s The issue
before the court in Hudson was whether the lease clause was violative of
the State or City Human Rights Law.174 Judge Titone went no further
to address the dissent's suggestion that the "Roommate Law"175 is
indicative of the legislature's desire not to include non-traditional couples
within the scope of the non-eviction regulation.
4. The Concurrence
Judge Bellacosa concurred in a separate, carefully worded
opinion. 76 He cautioned that where the legislative intent of a statute is
completely indecipherable and/or silent, the courts "are not empowered
or expected to expand or constrict the meaning of a legislatively chosen
word." 7r7 He reasoned that, although the Division of Housing and
Community Renewal (DHCR) had thus far declined to define "family,"
it did not mean that the agency would never define the term.' The
171. Id. The definition of "immediate family" in other sections of the code includes
"husband, wife, son, daughter, stepson, stepdaughter, father, mother, father-in-law or
mother-in-law." N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8605 (McKinney 1987). "Related persons"
are limited to "a parent, grandparent, child, stepchild, grandchild, brother or sister of
the tenant or of the tenant's spouse or the spouse of any of the foregoing." N.Y.
UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-403(e)(2)(i)(7)(v) (McKinney 1987). The Braschi definition of
family was not intended to revise these definitions.
172. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 210-11, 543 N.E.2d at 53, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 788
(discussing Hudson View, 59 N.Y.2d at 733, 450 N.E.2d at 234, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 428).
173. Id.
174. Id. (referring to N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(12) (McKinney 1987)).
175. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-f (McKinney 1987); see supra note 43 and
accompanying text.
176. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 214, 543 N.E.2d at 55, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 790
(Bellacosa, J., concurring).




possibility still existed that the legislature, or other authorized body,"7
would act to clarify the term's meaning in the future.110 The
concurrence admonished the plurality for creating a judicial definition of
"family," thereby substituting its own views for that of the DHCR -
especially where the "societal, governmental, policy and fiscal
implications are so sweeping." lot
The concurrence accused both the plurality and the dissent of
choosing polar extremes." Judge Bellacosa insisted that there was no
need to "yaw towards either end of the spectrum" because the decision in
Braschi could easily have been accomplished "on a narrow and legitimate
jurisprudential track."" s Traditionally, socially remedial statutes have
been accorded generous construction.' In light of the facts in this
case, and the nature of the non-eviction regulation, the court could have
concluded that Braschi was within the regulation's intended class of
"family" and had, therefore, demonstrated a likelihood of success on the
merits." 5 Rather than try to establish a comprehensive definition of
"family," the concurrence would have been content to engage in what it
called "interstitial adjudication."" Judge Bellacosa described this as a
process which occurs when a court cannot reach a majoritarian rule of
law, but it nevertheless resolves the dispute at hand.17 In other words,
the court ought to have resolved Braschi by generously construing the
term "family" but not defining family.
5. The Dissent
Judge Simons wrote the opinion in which the dissent asserted that
the "plurality has adopted a definition of family which extends the
language of the regulation well beyond the implication of the words used
179. In this case it is the DHCR, according to Judge Bellacosa, which should act.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
180. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 214, 543 N.E.2d at 56, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 791
(Bellacosa, J., concurring).
181. Id. (citing Breitel, The Lawmakers, 65 CoLuM. L. REv. 749, 767-71 (1965)).
182. Id. at 215, 543 N.E.2d at 56, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 791.
183. id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 214, 543 N.E.2d at 56, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 791.
186. Id. at 215, 543 N.E.2d at 56, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 791.
187. Id.
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in it."'  He voiced concern that by such an expansion of the term
"family," the court had created a definition which was not only
inconsistent with the legislative intent of the rent control code but beyond
the scope of § 2204.6(d).'I He accused the concurrence of
compounding the plurality's errors by merely deciding ipse dixit that the
plaintiff should prevail."
The dissent analyzed the legislative intent behind both the Rent
Control Code 9 ' and the Rent Stabilization Law and noted their
common purpose: to resume "the normal market of free bargaining
between a landlord and tenant. ' 193 Both statutes have non-eviction
regulations, but only the stabilization law defines "family." 1" Because
a rent-controlled apartment, once vacated, is subject to the stabilization
laws, ' Judge Simon maintained that by artificially expanding the
definition of "family," the court also artificially extended the time an
apartment is subject to rent control.' Furthermore, because the two
statutes share a common purpose, the definition of "family" in the Rent
Stabilization Law should be indicative of the class of persons which would
be eligible for a renewal lease to a rent-controlled apartment as
survivors. "
Judge Simons declared that there is "little doubt that the purpose
of § 2204.6(d) was to create succession rights to a possessory interest in
real property where the tenant of record has died or vacated the
188. Id. at 216, 543 N.E.2d at 57, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 792 (Simons, J., dissenting).
189. Id.
190. Id. Ipse dixit meaning literally "he himself spoke." BALLENTINE'S LAW
DICTIoNARY 666 (3d ed. 1969). The dissent criticized Judge Bellacosa's approach to
the case - "interstitial adjudication" - as being a mere decision that a party will prevail
but without substantiation for that opinion. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying
text.
191. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-401 (McKinney 1987); see supra notes 6-18 and
accompanying text.
192. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-501 (McKinney 1987); see supra notes 6-18 and
accompanying text.
193. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 217,543 N.E.2d at 57, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 792 (Simons,
J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 221, 543 N.E.2d at 57, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 795 (citing N.Y. UNCONSOL.
LAW § 2523.5(b)(1), (2) (McKinney 1987)).
195. Id. at 216, 543 N.E.2d at 57, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 792; see supra notes 9-12.
196. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 217, 543 N.E.2d at 57, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 792 (Simons,
J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 221, 543 N.E.2d at 57-58, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
310 [Vol. VIII
COMMENT
apartment."1  He supported this declaration by suggesting that when
a current tenant-of-record dies, a surviving family member or spouse
secures a new lease; theoretically, such renewals could continue ad
infinitum until a tenant chooses to voluntarily surrender that lease."9
The dissent relied heavily upon Hudson View Properties v.
Weiss" ° and the subsequent enactment of the "Roommate Law"' 01 to
support its belief that non-eviction regulation was not intended by the
legislature to be defined expansively. In Hudson View, the court held that
the unmarried heterosexual partner of the tenant-of-record could be
evicted because the lease specifically restricted occupancy.' The
Roommate Law was subsequently enactedm to prevent evictions of
unrelated persons cohabitating with the primary tenant, "as long as the
tenant-of-record continues to reside there."' The Law also clearly
states that such an unrelated occupant does not "acquire any right to
continued possession in the event the tenant vacates the premises. " "
The dissent insisted that the court of appeals had already reached the issue
of who qualifies as "immediate family" in its decision in Hudson
View.' Furthermore, if the term "family" were defined to encompass
unrelated persons, such a definition would conflict with the intent of the
Roommate Law which allows occupancy but affords no rights to unrelated
cohabitants.2"
Judge Simon criticized Judge Titone's four point test as "an
unworkable test subject to abuse, "2" and warned the plurality that it had
198. Id. at 218, 543 N.E.2d at 58, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 793 (citing In re Herzog v.
Joy, 53 N.Y.2d 821, 422 N.E.2d 582, 439 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1981)).
199. Id.
200. 59 N.Y.2d 733, 450 N.E.2d 234, 463 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1983); see supra notes
41-42 and accompanying text.
201. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-f (McKinney 1987); see supra notes 43, 175 and
accompanying text.
202. Hudson View, 59 N.Y.2d at 235, 450 N.E.2d at 429, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 735.
203. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-f. The Hudson case was overruled by the
"Roommate Law." For a detailed discussion of the decision in Hudson View and the
"Roommate Law," see Note, The Question of Succession in New York City: Who Has
the Right to Renew a Rent-Stabilized Lease?, 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 1831 (1988).
204. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 220, 543 N.E.2d at 59, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 794 (Simons,




208. Id. at 216, 543 N.E.2d at 57, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 792.
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drifted into the area of policymaking, "which is best left to the
legislature. "'  He attacked the plurality's contention that to define
"family" traditionally would be "to cast an even wider net" than would the
definition developed by the court. 21°  He supported this argument by
reminding the court that a family member seeking protection from eviction
would have to meet the "living with" requirement of 829 Seventh Avenue
in addition to his or her blood relationship. 2"
V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECISION
A. Gay Couples
Gay rights activists in New York and around the country consider
the decision a crowning success 212 and the American Civil Liberties
Union hailed the decision as a "ground-breaking victory for lesbians and
gay men."213 The decision is in fact a precedent because it is the first
time the highest court of any state has ruled that a homosexual couple
does have rights and can be considered a family unit. The significance
of the decision is especially apparent when contrasted with the legislative
prohibition of homosexual marriages 214 and "adoptions" by couples
eager to formalize their relationships.215
Prior to Braschi, it was common for landlords to evict the
surviving gay partner of the primary tenant if that person's name did not
209. Id. at 222, 543 N.E.2d at 60, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 796 (citing People v. Allen,
27 N.Y.2d 108, 112-3, 261 N.E.2d 637, 640, 313 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1970)).
210. Id. at 211 n.1, 543 N.E.2d at 54 n.1, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 789 n.1.
211. Id. at 222, 543 N.E.2d at 61, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 796 (citing 829 Seventh Ave.
Co. v. Reider, 67 N.Y.2d 930, 493 N.E.2d 939, 502 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1986)).
212. See Wise, Court Seen Taking on the Tough Ones, N.Y.L.J., July 10, 1989,
at 1, col. 5; Gutis, New York Defines Family to Include Homosexual Couples, N.Y.
Times, July 7, 1989, at At, col. 1; Gays Applaud New York Housing Decision, Nat'l
L.J., July 24, 1989, at 6, col. 1.
213. Gutis, supra note 212 (the ACLU represented Brasehi before the court).
214. See generally In re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 63 N.Y.2d 233, 239, 471
N.E.2d 424, 481 N.Y.S.2d 652, 654-55 (1984); Developments in the Law, Part V.,
Sexual Orientation and the Law: Same Sex Couples and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REv.
1508, 1603 (1989); Note, Property Rights of Same-Sex Couples: Toward a New
Definition of Family, 26 J. FAM. L. 357 (1987).




appear on the lease.216 In this manner, the property owner would be
able to raise the apartment's rent or even sell the apartment as a
cooperative or condominium unit. The surviving gay life partner would
be left to find suitable alternative housing in a market where the vacancy
rate for apartments at all rent levels is 2.46%.217
B. Other Non-Traditional Families
More broadly, the Braschi decision affects rent-controlled
apartment dwellers who are involved in non-traditonal relationships for a
myriad of reasons. A total of 155,361 such private rental units exist in
New York City.21 Although it is unclear what percent of these
controlled units are actually occupied by persons in non-traditional
families, there are indications that this figure may indeed be considerable.
Statistics show that only 45.6% of persons age 15 years and over in New
York City are married," 9 yet of the total number of persons living in
households, 67% live in multiple occupant households.' Of this
figure, 11% are living in households in which all or some of the
216. Oser, Extending the Right to a RenewalLease, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1989, at
RI0, col. 5.
217. Rasky, Homeless Plan Called Meager for New York, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4,
1989, at B1, col. 5. The vacancy rate for apartments with rents under $300 a month is
0.96%. Id. The vacancy rate for apartments with rents in the $300 to $400 a month
range is 2.15%. Id. at B6, col. 3. In order for an apartment rental market to run
efficiently, that market should have a "normal" vacancy rate of at least 5%. Id.
Moreover, there are usually financial hurdles that a gay survivor would need
to overcome before securing suitable housing. AIDS is a severe financial drain and
savings are often depleted. The total cost of care for an AIDS patient is estimated at
$147,000. Freudenheim, Benefit in Treating AIDS at Home, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21,
1989, at D2, col. 1.
218. Brief for Amici Curiae Family Service of America, Institute for the Study of
Human Resources, Bar Association for Human Rights of Greater New York, Reverend
Paul Moore, Riverside Church Office of Peace and Social Justice, Reverend Forrest
Church, and Rabbi Balfour Brichner at 28, Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 74 N.Y.2d
201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989) (No. 02194-87) [hereinafter Brief for
Amici Curiae] (this is a 1987 figure).
219. Id. at 67 (citing 1980 Census of Population, Part 34, General Population
Characteristics of New York, table 49). Note that this figure may be considerably
overstated because participants are allowed to categorize themselves however they feel
best reflects their relationships. Id. at 67 n.2. Even though New York does not
recognize real or ostensible common law marriages, some persons categorize themselves
as such. Id.
220. Id. at 66.
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occupants are unrelated by blood, marriage or adoption," and 1% of
all multiple occupant households include foster families.22
A majority of these households are comprised of the poor, who
for economic and historic reasons are unable to live in traditionally
recognized relationships.tm There are many tenants, now elderly, who
have resided in controlled apartments since the controls were first
established after World War II. These elderly tenants have lower incomes
than those in other kinds of rental units.' Often, they live in
"makeshift" families out of fear and loneliness; their relationships are
rarely legitimized for fear that they will lose their social security benefits
from the government.'
C. Other Applications
Although the decision in Braschi was not originally intended to
apply to the 935,000 stabilized apartments' in New York City, the
DHCR has adopted new regulations which revise the definition of "family
member" in both the rent control and rent stabilization laws. ' 7 These
permanent "emergency" regulations bestow lease renewal rights to any
family member 28 who has resided for at least two years with the rent-
controlled or rent-stabilized tenant and meets certain criteria.' These
factors are essentially the same as those found in Braschi: sharing of
expenses; intermingling of finances; engaging in family-type activities and
evidence of a long-term emotional relationship.' ° The regulations
further extend Braschi by protecting the family member from
221. Id. at 66 n.2.
222. Id. at 66.
223. Gutis, supra note 212 at B16, col. 1.
224. Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 218, at 28.
225. 42 U.S.C. § 402(a), (b), (c) (1983) (the benefits of those taking by virtue of
the fact that they are widows or widowers are cut in half by remarriage).
226. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 210, 543 N.E.2d at 53, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
227. N.Y. St. Reg., Nov. 29, 1989, at 23-29. These regulations were adopted
without changes but with clarifications and amplifications. N.Y. St. Reg., Apr. 4, 1990,
at 13-20.
228. Family member is defined as any member of the tenant's immediate family,
extended family, "in-laws" or "any other person residing in the housing accommodation
as a primary residence who can prove emotional and financial commitment and
interdependence." N.Y. St. Reg., Nov. 29, 1989, at 24.
229. Id. at 25.
230. Id. at 25-26.
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displacement when the tenant permanently vacates the housing "regardless
of the reason" for his or her departure." A tenant has the option, to
notify the landlord at any time of persons who might be eligible for such
protection in the event the tenant vacates, but there are no penalties for
failing to do so.232 The Rent Stabilization Association has brought an
action to restrain the implementation of these new regulations.
z3
Landlords of rent-stabilized dwellings run the risk of losing vacancy rent
increases and foregoing the opportunity to sell the apartment on the open
market if there is such an eligible family member in residence.'
The New York Appellate Division has demonstrated support for
the DHCR's regulations. In East 10th Street Associates v. Estate of
Goldstein, 5 the court held that extension of the Braschi decision to
tenants of rent stabilized apartments was justified.2 6 Although the court
conceded that there are differences between the rent control and rent
stabilization regulations governing evictions, it determined that those
differences were not substantial enough to "mandate a different definition
of 'family'. . . . It would be anomalous to hold that a life partner could
be a valid family member for the purpose of protection from eviction
from a rent-controlled apartment but not a valid member insofar as
eviction from a rent-stabilization apartment is concerned."237
The court also indicated that it is "much less onerous" to the
landlord to extend the definition of "family" in the rent-stabilization
context to include such relationships than under the rent control code.23
A landlord of a rent controlled unit forgoes the opportunity to decontrol
the apartment and return it to market rates whereas a rent-stabilized
landlord merely forgoes a slightly higher rent.'
There have been several applications of the Braschi decision at the
lower court level in New York City as well as other courts of various
levels around the nation. In New York, the appellate term extended
protection to a retarded and handicapped 12 year old girl who had lived
231. N.Y. St. Reg., Apr. 4, 1990, at 13.
232. N.Y. St. Reg., Nov. 29, 1990, at 25-26.
233. DHCR Issues New Apartment Pass-on Regs, APARTMENT L. INSIDER, Apr.
1990, at 11.
234. See Oser, supra note 216, at R10, col. 7.
235. 154 A.D.2d 142, 552 N.Y.S.2d 257 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
236. Id. at 145, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 258.
237. Id.
238. id., 552 N.Y.S.2d at 259.
239. Id.
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with a "foster" mother nearly all her life.' The woman, who had
never formally adopted the girl, also provided a home for a full-time
registered nurse who cared for them in the rent-controlled apartment."
The court ruled that both the nurse and the girl should be treated as the
woman's "family" and they, therefore, could not be evicted. 2 In so
ruling, this court has paved the way for applications of Braschi in platonic
relationships.
The influence of the Braschi decision is also apparent in the area
of cooperative and condominium law. In Estate of Larry S. Salters," 3
the deceased's main asset was shares in a cooperative apartment which he
had shared with his life partner. The estate requested that a new
certificate be issued in acknowledgment of the surviving partner's
rights.2 The cooperative refused on the grounds that the deceased
tenant's partner was not a "family member," as intended, under the
proprietary lease.' " The litigation is pending.
Recently the New York Surrogate's Court of King's County, in
Estate of William Thomas Cooper,' firmly rejected Braschi by holding
that homosexual survivors have no right to exercise a spousal right of
election under New York State's inheritance statutes.4 7  The court
discounted the Braschi definition of family by ruling that the decision was
not controlling in the area of estate law.' Differing public policy goals
were cited.' 9
Gay activists are eager to apply the court's ruling to the area of
benefits such as employee health insurance plans.' A teachers'
240. Rayen Dev. Corp. v. Titus, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 20, 1989, at 21, col. 3 (N.Y.
App. Term Feb. 3, 1989).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. N.Y.L.J., Mar. 15, 1990, at 22, col. 4 (N.Y. Surrogate's Ct. Mar. 15, 1990).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. No. 1718/88 (N.Y. Surrogate's Ct. Dec. 19, 1990) (1990 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
639).
247. Id., slip op. at 7-8; N.Y. EST. POwERs & TRUSTS LAw §§ 5-1.1 to 5-1.2
(McKinney 1987).
248. Cooper, No. 1718/88, slip op. at 7.
249. Id. at 11. Foremost among the policy goals cited by the King's County
Surrogate was the "compelling interest in fostering the traditional institution of marriage
... and family as a basic fabric of our society . . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
250. Sherman, New York Ruling Raises Hopes: Gay Couples Seek Recognition,
Nat'l L.J., July 31, 1989, at 3, col. 1.
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association has filed a claim against the New York City Board of
Education." The complaint alleges that the city discriminates against
school employees on the basis of sexual orientation. 2 The association
alleges that the gay life partners of these employees do not enjoy the same
health insurance benefits as their heterosexual colleagues' spouses.'
Similarly, three lesbian city library employees are suing the Minneapolis
City Library Board on the grounds that their denial of the same
compensation as married couples amounts to unequal pay for equal
work.?-
Braschi has also been unsuccessfully relied upon in a suit for
visitation rights by a non-biological "parent." In Allison D. v. Virginia
M., ' two women who shared a lesbian relationship agreed to become
parents by artificial insemination. The relationship failed and the plaintiff,
alleging that she and the defendant had lived in a "family unit," claimed
she stood in loco parentis.' Although the court refused to extend
visitation rights to the plaintiff, the dissent indicated a narrow construction
of the term "parent" was inconsistent with the Braschi court's definition
of the term "family." Z
7
D. Analysis and Criticism of the Decision
Despite the generally positive reception of the ruling, there is the
question of whether the decision is too expansive and, therefore, more
"symbolism" than substance. 8  If the plurality's conclusions are
perceived by other courts as too radical or unmanageable, it is then
possible that the opinions expressed by the concurrence will become the
more accepted interpretation of the Braschi decision. Critics of the




254. Id. (citing Anglin v. Minneapolis City Library Bd., No. 1330 036787 (Minn.
Dep't of Civ. Rights)).
255. 58 U.S.L.W. 2548 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 3, 1990) (No. 3042E).
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Spencer, Gay Partner Held Entilled to Lease, N.Y.L.J., July 7, 1989, at 1,
col. 3.
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decision are quick to point out it was the result of a deeply divided
court.' The division arose from the plurality's eagerness to establish
a judicial definition of "family" and the reluctance by the concurrence to
intrude upon the realm of the legislature. The concurrence, though
agreeing in the result, believed that the means were drastic.
Braschi's weakness lies in its controversial four-point test. The
factors in this checklist include slippery concepts such as "emotional
commitment" and "interdependence." Though the factors are reasonable
enough, they require individualized evaluation. Individualized
determinations translate into an increased case-load upon our already
over-burdened court system and inconsistent holdings. The decision may
act as an inducement for fraud; an occupant intent in acquiring rights to
an apartment might create a family-like living arrangement with the
primary tenant to support that occupant's claim of survivor rights. By
artificially satisfying the court's requirements of "emotional and financial
commitment and interdependence," the person abusing the system would
subordinate the rights of a property owner to his or her own manufactured
claim. Perhaps an even more basic flaw is that a family member seeking
a renewal lease to an apartment which the primary tenant has vacated
will, in many instances, encounter resistance from the landlord. Because
the criteria to be applied are so vague and subjective, that person may be
drawn into protracted litigation. This added expense coming on the heels
of an economic and emotional upheaval may prove impossible to bear for
those in the most dire of circumstances. A survivor may prefer to walk
away rather than wait for the court's determination.
The American family has undergone changes in the last 20 years
which some characterize as turmoil. In 1988, fewer than 27% of the
nation's 91 million households fit the traditional model of a nuclear
family.' °  "Opposite-sex couples" account for 2.6 million of all
households" and "same-sex couples" account for 1.6 million.'
Braschi's deponents fear that the decision undercuts already waning
societal morals and values.' Such critics believe that the meaning of
259. Id. (Chief Justice Wachtler, a very influential vote on the bench, removed
himself from the case).
260. Seligmann, Variations on a Theme: Gay and Lesbian Couples, NEWSWEEK,
Special Edition, Winter/Spring 1990, at 38, 38-39.
261. Id. at 39.
262. Id.
263. See Glaberson, Ruling Stretches Legal Concept of Family, N.Y. Times, July
8, 1989, at 25, col. 2.
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the term "family" is self-evident, and it should be used in its most
traditional sense. Despite increased tolerance of homosexual
relationships,' 69% of those polled do not believe that homosexual
couples should have the same legal rights as married ones.'
VI. CONCLUSION
The Braschi decision reaffirmed those lower court decisions which
held that the non-eviction regulation of the Rent Control Code protects
persons who hold themselves as and, are in turn considered to be,
"family" of the primary tenant of record, even though there exists no
relationship by blood, marriage or adoption. It clarified its own holding
in Hudson Viewt by painstakingly pointing out that the issues in
Braschi were not before the court when it decided the former. In
deciding Braschi in a manner sensitive to the needs of those persons who
already face adversity because of their chosen lifestyles, the court has
exchanged a host of contrived decisions for one which reflects the
lifestyles of its citizens.
DHCR's prompt response to Braschi is a victory for those who
live in non-traditional arrangements but it remains to be seen what impact
the decision will have in non-housing contexts. Marriage remains the
only legally recognized relationship that two adults can share, and the
bulk of society's rights, benefits and privileges revolve around this
traditional institution. Persons in non-traditional families need a way to
solemnize their relationships if they choose not to marry or unable to do
so. One alternative is legislation that would permit registration of
"domestic partnerships."' Such legislation, which exists abroad in
264. Kagay, Homosexuals Gain More Acceptance, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1989, at
A24, col. 1. Forty-seven percent of those polled said homosexual relations between
consenting adults should be legal whereas in the previous sampling in 1987, that figure
was only 33%. Id. Seventy-one percent said homosexuals should have equal job
opportunities up from 59% in 1982. Id.
265. For Better or Worse?, NEWSWEEK, Special Edition, Winter/Spring 1990, at
18 (analysis of Newsweek Poll taken by The Gallup Association). Sixty-one percent of
those polled do not believe that unmarried (non-homosexual) couples should have the
same rights as married couples. Id.
266. 59 N.Y.2d 733, 450 N.E.2d 234, 463 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1983); see supra notes
41-42, 200-07 and accompanying text.
267. See Rule, Rights for Gay Couples in Denmark, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1989, at
8, col. 4; Seligmann, supra note 260.
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Denmark and recently passed the Board of Supervisors in San
Francisco," would effectively grant legal recognition to unmarried
heterosexuals and homosexual couples. This legal recognition would in
turn qualify them for a host of benefits presently accorded to traditional
married couples.'
Although the court did not discuss the AIDS crisis in its decision,
it undoubtedly played a major role in its determination. New York has
the greatest concentration of this nation's 45,748 AIDS cases' and
65% of all reported AIDS cases involve gay or bisexual males. 1  In
situations where the primary tenant of record dies, and the survivor's
name is not on the lease, that survivor would be subject to eviction under
a traditional interpretation of the term "family" in the regulations. The
Braschi decision offers some protection and comfort to those persons who
cannot protect themselves under the cloak of marriage.
Despite criticism that the decision is overbroad and that it will be
difficult to implement, Braschi is a landmark in the movement towards a
less paternalistic, more realistic view of the American family. The court
has taken a lead in defining the rights of persons in non-traditional
arrangements and by doing so is at the forefront of the law.
Eileen Kaspar
268. Seligmann, supra note 260.
269. Id.
270. Freudenheim, supra note 217. Another source quotes this figure as 56,212 as
of March 1988. Note, Public Hysteria, Private Conflict: Child Custody and Visitation
Disputes Involving an HIV Infected Parent, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1092, 1094 n.17
[hereinafter Public Hysteria] (citing Leads from the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly
Report, Quarterly Report to the Domestic Policy Council on the Prevalence and Rate of
Spread of HIV and AIDS in the United States, 259 J. AM. MED. A. 2657, 2657 (1988)).
271. Note, Public Hysteria, supra note 270, at 1095 n.24 (citing Leads from the
Morbidity Weekly Report, Update: Acquired Immunity Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) -
Worldwide, 259 J. AM. MED. A. 3104, 3107 (1988)).
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